

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 PM-03 CIAE-00

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AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY ROME
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 09485

LIMDIS

HELSINKI FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: GW, PFOR, PARM, US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN SCHEEL

SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON FONMIN SCHEEL
JULY 2 FOR A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF US-FRG AND US-
EUROPEAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE LATTER'S DEPARTURE FROM
BONN FOR THE CSCE PHASE I. SCHEEL TALKED MAINLY ABOUT
THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN
RELATIONS WITH EUROPE, CONCENTRATING, AS MOST COMMENTA-
TORS HAVE DONE, ON THE AGREEMENT FOR THE PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR WAR. HE SPOKE IN RATHER POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT
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THE FUTURE OF US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION, SAYING THAT HE
AGREED ABOUT THE NEED FOR A FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF THE
STRUCTURE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP AND THAT HE DID NOT CON-
SIDER THE RESULTS OF THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT INCONSISTENT

WITH THE DETENTE POLICY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE EXPRESSED A GOOD MANY OF THE CONCERNS THAT WE HAVE HEARD IN RECENT DAYS FROM A VARIETY OF GERMAN OFFICIALS AND THAT HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN PRESS COMMENTARY. THE HEART OF THIS GERMAN CONCERN, AS SCHEEL EXPRESSED IT, IS THAT THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT, BY PROVIDING FOR CONSULTATIONS, HAS REDUCED THE RISK TO THE SOVIET UNION OF INDULGING IN ADVENTURES IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN EUROPE. END SUMMARY.

1. OPENING THE DISCUSSION, THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL, FOLLOWING THE RECENT SERIES OF BILATERAL SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH THE USSR AND BEFORE THE OPENING OF PHASE ONE OF CSCE, TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS US-FRG AND US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO TRANSMIT TO SECRETARY ROGERS ANY PARTICULAR CONCERNS THE MINISTER MIGHT HAVE AND ANY SPECIAL POINTS HE MIGHT WISH TO RAISE WHEN IN HELSINKI.

2. SCHEEL DENIED THAT THE GERMANS WERE "CONCERNED" OVER THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS IN US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. THE FRG FELT THAT WASHINGTON HAD BEEN PURSUING A CONSISTENT POLICY, AND INDEED THE FRG HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO ENSURE THAT ITS OWN POLICY WAS IN HARMONY WITH THE APPROACH TOWARD DETENTE BEING TAKEN BY THE US.

3. NEVERTHELESS, SCHEEL SAID, THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR HAD COME AS SOMETHING OF A SURPRISE, EVEN THOUGH THE FRG HAD BEEN "INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF ITS CONCLUSION. IT WAS NOT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT THAT WAS SURPRISING, HE ADDED; ON THE CONTRARY, IT APPEARED TO BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE DETENTE POLICY WHICH IS NOW COMMON TO THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. BUT HE SAID THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AGREEMENT'S CONCLUSION AND THE RATHER UNUSUAL FORM IN WHICH IT WAS DRAWN UP DID RAISE SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE FRG.

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4. SAYING THAT THE AGREEMENT BECAME MORE INTERESTING EACH TIME ONE READ IT, SCHEEL IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS:

(A) THE US AND USSR HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR COMMON DETERMINATION TO PREVENT ARMED CONFLICTS FROM DEVELOPING--AT LEAST SUCH ONES AS WOULD ENTAIL A SERIOUS RISK OF DEGENERATING INTO NUCLEAR WAR;

(B) THE TWO SIDES HAVE PROVIDED FOR A KIND OF "INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT";

(C) THEY HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR INTENTION TO KEEP

CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE,
IN THEIR OWN HANDS.

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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5. SCHEEL REPEATED THAT THIS ALL APPEARED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. AMONG OTHER THINGS, IT WAS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE US AND SOVIET COLLABORATION ON NPT. OF COURSE, THE FRG, AS A NON-ATOMIC POWER, HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN WHAT WAS GOING ON.

6. AS A POLITICIAN, SCHEEL SAID, HE WAS NATURALLY IN FAVOR OF EVERYTHING THAT WORKED TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO WAGE WAR. MOREOVER, HE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THE GROWING DEMANDS OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, IF THEY COULD NOT BE CURBED, WOULD EAT UP THE SUB-

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STANCE OF EVEN THE WEALTHIEST STATES AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE US AND THE USSR DID NOT WANT TO CONSUME THEIR

ENERGIES IN THIS UNPRODUCTIVE FIELD WHILE LETTING THE REST OF THE WORLD, UNDER THE SHADE OF THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA PROVIDED BY THE SUPER-POWERS, DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO MORE SATISFYING AND ECONOMICALLY MORE RATIONAL PUR-SUITS.

7. THE BASIC QUESTION ONE HAD TO ASK, SCHEEL SAID, WAS WHETHER ANYTHING HAD CHANGED OR WAS IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGING AT THE HEART OF NATO POLICY. NATO DEPENDED IN ESSENCE ON THE ELEMENT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, AND A VITAL ASPECT OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT WAS THE "INCALCULABILITY" OF ITS USE. UNTIL NOW, THE OTHER SIDE HAD HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER EVEN A LIMITED CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO PULL THE NUCLEAR TRIGGER. (SCHEEL CONCEDED THAT THE POLICY OF "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE" MIGHT HAVE WEAKENED THIS POSITION SOMEWHAT BY MAKING IT REASONABLY CLEAR, IF NOT CERTAIN, THAT A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY CALL FORTH A NUCLEAR RESPONSE.) THE QUESTION THAT NOW AROSE WAS WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR DID NOT DETRACT FROM THE "INCALCULABILITY" THAT HAD HITHERTO CHARACTERIZED THE SITUATION. AT ANY RATE, IT APPEARED TO SCHEEL THAT IT "RELATIVISED" IT. INDEED, THE CONSULTATION PROVISION PROVIDED THE OTHER SIDE WITH A DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT ATOMIC WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE USED, THEREBY INTRODUCING A MEASURE OF "CALCULABILITY" IN THE FUTURE.

8. TALKING IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS, SCHEEL SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY CONVINCED OF THE DESIRABILITY OF FULL POLITICAL UNION. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS SHOULD DEVELOP AS MANY CONTACTS TO EASTERN EUROPE AS POSSIBLE, IN THE EXPECTATION THAT, SO LONG AS THIS WERE DONE GRADUALLY ENOUGH TO AVOID POLITICAL DISRUPTIONS, SOME BENEFICIAL CHANGES FOR EUROPE AS A WHOLE WOULD ULTIMATELY ENSUE. THE MAIN SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEANS IN PURSUING A LONG-TERM POLICY OF THIS KIND WAS THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE, WHICH WAS NOT A FULLY INTEGRATED

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MEMBER OF NATO AND WHICH, IN SCHEEL'S VIEW, DID NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO CARRY OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DEVELOPING ITS OWN ATOMIC FORCE AS IN THE PAST. IT WAS POSSIBLE, SCHEEL THOUGHT, THAT THE EVIDENT GROWTH IN COMMON INTERESTS BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROVIDE A NEW IMPULSE FOR THE WE'S TO OVERCOME PAST DIFFERENCES, BUT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE DIFFICULT TO BRING THE FRENCH ALONG. AS FOR A POSSIBLE "STRUCTURAL CHANGE" IN NATO THAT WOULD PERMIT THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN COMMON NUCLEAR FORCE, THERE STILL WAS NO

ANSWER TO THE OLD QUESTION OF WHO WOULD HAVE A RIGHT OF DISPOSITION OVER THIS FORCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, SCHEEL MENTIONED A REMARK BY POMPIDOU IN HIS RECENT CONSULTATION WITH CHANCELLOR BRANDT. POMPIDOU, SPEAKING OF EUROPEAN UNION, SAID THAT SUCH A UNITED EUROPE WOULD NEED MINISTERS, AND THAT THE LAST WOULD BE THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTER. HE THEN CORRECTED HIMSELF TO SAY THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE NEXT TO LAST AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER LAST, SINCE A COMMON DEFENSE POLICY WAS UNTHINKABLE BEFORE A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY HAD BEEN ATTAINED.

9. THE AMBASSADOR, REFERRING TO THE SOMEWHAT ALARMED FRG PRESS COMMENT ON THE NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT, POINTED OUT THAT THE US AND FRG HAD HISTORICALLY GONE THROUGH VARIOUS CRISES OF CONFIDENCE DATING BACK TO THE DAYS OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER, ALMOST ALL RELATED IN ONE WAY OR

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ANOTHER TO THE US RELATIONSHIP TO THE USSR. THERE WAS ALWAYS AN UNDERLYING FEAR OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NUCLEAR GIANTS MIGHT COLLABORATE TO THE DETRIMENT OF THEIR ALLIES. SUCH FEARS TENDED TO BECOME PARTICULARLY

ACUTE AT THE TIME OF SUMMIT CONFERENCES. THERE WAS AN INCLINATION TO OVERDRAMATIZE THE AGREEMENTS THAT WERE CONCLUDED AT SUCH CONFERENCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. IN ANY EVENT, WE HAD NO INTENTION OF DOWNGRADING NATO OR THE ROLE OF THE US DETERRENT IN NATO.

10. SCHEEL SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO REGARD THE AMBASSADOR'S LAST STATEMENT SOMEWHAT SKEPTICALLY. THERE WAS A "COINCIDENTAL CONSISTENCY" IN RECENT STATEMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS, E.G. THE KISSINGER SPEECH
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AND THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOLLOWED BY THE SCHLESINGER STATEMENTS AT DPC. THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT PERSUADING THE EUROPEANS TO REVIEW AND RECONSIDER THE STRUCTURE OF US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION. THIS, SCHEEL THOUGHT, WAS ENTIRELY RIGHT. THERE WAS INDEED A QUESTION WHETHER IN A PERIOD OF CHANGE WE SHOULD GO ON LIVING FROM HAND TO MOUTH, AS IT WERE, OR WHETHER WE OUGHT NOT TO ESTABLISH A NEW BASIS FOR LONG-TERM COOPERATION THAT WOULD INEVITABLY ENTAIL SOME CHANGES IN EXISTING STRUCTURES. MOREOVER, SCHEEL SAID, IT WAS ABSURD THAT SOME PEOPLE WOULD MONETARY QUESTIONS AS THOUGH THEY WERE ENTIRELY UNRELATED TO SECURITY. THE FRG WAS WILLING TO TALK ABOUT THE OVER-ALL RELATIONSHIP, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALL OF ITS PARTS. IT WAS PERFECTLY EVIDENT WHY THE US, FOR ITS PART, HAD AN INTEREST IN DOING THIS.

11. WHAT HAD DISTURBED THE EUROPEANS IN THE RECENT PAST WAS THE "MODEST DIMENSIONS" OF CONSULTATION. CLOSER AND MORE INTENSE CONSULTATIONS WERE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN CONNECTION WITH MBFR, SCHEEL THOUGHT. IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE NATO STATES NOT APPEAR IN VIENNA AS AN UNCOORDINATED GROUP WITHOUT A REAL COMMON POSITION TO OPPOSE TO THE UNIFIED VIEWS OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS.

12. SCHEEL SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE CHINESE REACTION TO THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, ASKING WHETHER WE HAD HAD ANY CONTACTS WITH THEM YET ON THE SUBJECT. IT WAS HIS OWN VIEW THAT THE RECENT CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY STAGED AS A KIND OF ANSWER.

13. SCHEEL RAISED A NUMBER OF CONSIDERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT NIXON TO EUROPE.

(A) ASSUMING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE BY FALL TO AGREE ON THE TEXT OF A FULL-BLOWN JOINT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, THE FRG STILL THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WELL TO HAVE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH SOME OF THE

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ELEMENTS OF FUTURE US-EUROPEAN COOPERATION WOULD BE SET FORTH.

(B) RE NATO, IF THERE WERE SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION, ONE MIGHT CONSIDER A MEETING OF NAC AT THE LEVEL OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, WE MIGHT WISH TO

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INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 ACDA-10 MBFR-02 SAJ-01

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CONSIDER THAT THE PRESIDENT MEET WITH NATO MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE.

(C) RE MEETING WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ASSUMING A SUMMIT MEETING WAS NOT POSSIBLE (OWING TO FRENCH OPPOSITION), THE FRG WOULD FAVOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE MINISTERS OF EC COUNTRIES, GIVING THE PRESIDENT A CHANCE TO MAKE A STATEMENT AND THEN PROVIDING AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE FOR AN INTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

14. SCHEEL NOTED THAT THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO BE
RESERVED ABOUT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS
(WHETHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OR MINISTERS OF FOREIGN
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AFFAIRS) AND THE PRESIDENT. THEY ARE MORE SKEPTICAL
ABOUT A MEETING IN THE EC FRAMEWORK THAN IN NATO. AT
THE SAME TIME, HE THOUGHT THAT AS A RESULT OF HIS RECENT
CONVERSATIONS WITH JOBERT HE COULD DETECT MORE FLEXI-
BILITY IN THE FRENCH POSITION THAN THEY HAVE LATELY
BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR. HE IMPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT IT
QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE FRENCH WOULD EVENTUALLY COME
CLOSER TO THE FRG VIEWPOINT ON THIS QUESTION.

HILLENBRAND

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